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The Baran Ratio, Investment, and British Economic Growth and Development 
Thomas E. Lambert, PhD 
University of Louisville 




Investment in capital, new technology, and agricultural techniques has not been considered an 
endeavor worthwhile in a medieval economy because of a lack of strong property rights and no incentive 
on the part of lords and barons to lend money to or grant rights to peasant farmers.  Therefore, the 
medieval economy and standards of living at that time often have been characterized as non-dynamic and 
static due to insufficient investment in innovative techniques and technology.  Paul Baran’s concept of the 
economic surplus is applied to investment patterns during the late medieval, mercantile, and early 
capitalist stages of economic growth in England and the UK.  This paper uses Zhun Xu’s Baran Ratio 
concept to try to develop general trends to demonstrate and to reinforce other historical accounts of these 
times that a productive and sufficient level of public and private investment out of accumulated capital 
income, taxation, and rents does not have a real impact on economic per capita growth until around the 
1600s in Britain.  This would also be about the time of capitalism’s ascent as the dominant economic 
system in England.  Even then, dramatic increases in investment and economic growth do not appear until 
the late 18th Century when investment more consistently becomes more than one hundred percent of the 
level of economic surplus and takes in government spending.  The types of investment, threshold amounts 
of investment out of profits and rents along with government spending seem to matter when it comes to a 
growth path raising GDP per capita and national income per capita to higher levels.  Although much of 
this knowledge perhaps is embodied in current historical accounts, the Baran Ratio nicely summarizes 
and illustrates the importance of levels of investment to economic growth.    
JEL Codes:  B51, E11, E12, N13  
 











Under capitalism, many businesses use part or all of the proceeds of their profits to buy more 
property, plant, inventory, and equipment if opportunities to expand and earn greater profits exist.  Under 
feudalism, an economic system that is generally characterized as one that lacks the property rights to 
encourage producers to re-invest in or add to their productive capital (North and Thomas 1971 and 1973, 
McCloskey 1972, Brenner 1976 and 1985, Dimmock 2014), such investment is only expected to occur on 
a very small scale. There is little incentive for serfs to use any gains from their work to try to expand their 
efforts and output.1   Any production above a level of subsistence for the peasant farmers and their 
families would go to lords and barons as surplus, and therefore efforts to invest or innovate were not 
worthwhile.  Lords could often coerce and gain more output from them through simple intimidation and 
brute force (Dobb 1947, Brenner 1976 and 1985).  Surplus extracted from the feudal economy can be 
considered to be wasted mostly on “unproductive” expenditures by the aristocracy on large palaces, court 
jesters, minstrels, the military, and cathedrals, or items which do not create use value or expand the 
productive capacity of a society by increasing labor productivity (Baran 1953 and 1957, Engels 1957, 
Smith 2000).   
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that 
political institutions shape economic outcomes as opposed to the general Marxian view that economic and 
material circumstances mostly determine political and social institutions.  They argue that the ownership 
of key resources is enabled by legal and political institutions which in turn dictate the dominant mode of 
production.  Therefore, according to them, the lord’s or baron’s legal or political control over land and 
water and water mills gave rise to serfdom and feudalism rather than small scale subsistence farming 
leading to or reinforcing the system of demesnes and feudalism.  The purpose of this paper is not to 
 
1Sato (2018) points out that claims and rights to land and land usage were multi-layered under feudalism with 
lords holding political power over the land while serfs and other commoners of lower classes had rights to use it 
for subsistence farming, fishing, etc. as long as they shared in the proceeds of their harvests and catches.  He 
argues that it is not until under capitalism that land becomes a commodity and then ownership and rights to land 
revert to just one person or group of owners who are part of one social class.  Multi-layered ownership along class 
lines cease to exist.   
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examine which comes first or which is more important but to look at the changes in economic 
circumstances over time regarding investment levels while noting some important historical 
developments in English and British history.     
Feudalism probably was weakened due to less and less arable land being available for agriculture, 
and plagues and famines2, which caused labor shortages and increasing labor costs.  Since food 
production often could not keep up with increases in population due to shortages of arable land, small 
petty producers, merchant traders, and yeoman farmers started taking some of the profits they earned and 
reinvested them back into their operations to finance more productivity, output, and expansion (Brenner 
1976 and 1985, Heller 2011, Dimmock 2014).  Colander (2020, 73-75) and others claimed that it was 
during the 15th Century that mercantilism evolved from feudalism thanks to the growth of markets, 
trading, urban areas, global exploration and a larger presence of the government in economic activities 
through its sanctioning of guilds and sponsorship of exploration.  With the Industrial Revolution and the 
ascendancy of manufacturers and major commodities producers, capitalism had fully replaced 
mercantilism, although farming in some parts of Europe had already been transformed through greater 
investment and output (Heller 2011, 89, Colander 2020, 74-75).  
This paper’s empirical research develops general trends that support the view that it probably is 
not until the 1600s and especially after 1780 that capital income, investment spending, and investment 
levels begin to reach a critical threshold of a society’s economic surplus, that is, a surplus that is society’s 
cumulative capital income and land income plus tax revenues (Baran 1957, Baran and Sweezy 1966, Xu 
2019, Lambert 2020).3  With this, standards of living dramatically begin to advance in England and the 
United Kingdom (UK) with the greatest advances being made in the 1800s.  Productive outlets for 
 
2 Which some have claimed were also caused indirectly by a mini-ice age (e.g, Fagan 2000, Blom 2019 among 
others). 
3 Stanfield (1974) emphasized one of Baran’s (1957) concepts of the economic surplus as potential output less 
essential consumption of a society to yield potential surplus. Without knowing or being able to estimate slack in 
the British economy from the 13th to 19th Centuries., this paper focuses on Baran’s concept of the actual surplus, 
which is actual output minus essential consumption.   
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investment make themselves available at this time which helps per capita economic growth, although 
capital income has to rebound as a share of economic surplus and net national income after being lower 
for several prior centuries (1400s to 1600s).    
If data sources for this paper are correct (Clark 2009, Broadberry, et al 2015), capital income and 
economic surplus levels might have been higher in the 13th and 14th Centuries than in the next several 
centuries and did not reach higher levels again until the 1700s in Britain.  See Figures 1 to 3.  Money for 
investment was available in the late medieval period, but because of few incentives for productive 
investment, it was mostly wasted on what some consider unproductive pursuits, and therefore it had little 
if much impact on economic growth.  It is granted that the building of cathedrals and palaces employed 
many people, yet constructing these edifices probably did not in turn raise the current or future 
productivity of a nation’s workforce that much.  In the transition period of the 15th to 16th Centuries, 
investment levels would still be predicted to be low since capitalism was still not the predominant 
economic system as mercantilism and trading still reigned.  High labor costs (Clark 2009, Humphries and 
Weisdorf 2019) for several centuries might have prevented the formation of a large enough economic 
surplus to justify investment too.  In the 17th Century, the economic surplus began to grow again thanks to 
a growth in capital income and a lowering of wages, and these events led to the beginning of a more 
consistent and greater level of capital investment in mostly productive endeavors.4,5      
(Insert Figures 1 to 3 around here)  
 
4 Rimmer, Higgins, and Pollard (1971) assess the year-to-year rates of investment in the 18th and 19th Centuries in 
the UK and estimate it to be slower than other estimates and believe a lot of capital investment undertaken was 
due to the rapid deterioration of many forms of plant and equipment.  They cite the frequency with which 
horseshoes and many farm tools had to be replaced.  Nonetheless, such replacement was necessary to propel 
agricultural output to higher levels, and therefore the investment expenditures were still productive.   
5 The debate over productive versus non-productive pursuits and occupations can be traced at least as far back as 
Adam Smith (2000(1776)).  In general, those commercial and governmental activities and occupations which do 
not add to or help to create value in the production or distribution of products or services are considered 
unproductive whereas those that do add value are productive.  In an enterprise, workers who design and create a 
product would be considered productive whereas cleaning and bookkeeping personnel, although important, would 
not really be considered productive.  In classical political economy this was an important distinction, and it is still 
considered important to many heterodox economists.  It has mostly been discarded, however, by mainstream and 
neoclassical economists.  It is not a primary focus of this paper, however.  
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 This paper proceeds as follows.  The next section, Analysis, describes the data sources used in the 
research for this paper, the definitions of key variables, and the displays of data.  Finally, a Discussion 
and Conclusion section discusses the implications of the findings for historical and modern economic 
performance and prospects.   
Analysis 
Lambert (2021) uses Clark (2009) data to estimate levels of aggregate capital stock, investment, 
and government surpluses and deficits on a decadal basis from 1200 to 1860, and this is a time span 
longer than what has been previously estimated by other researchers who mostly stop their estimates in 
the 17th or 18th Centuries.6   Using Lambert’s conjectures, Figure 4 illustrates the growth of the estimated 
real capital stock over several centuries, and it is shown that growth in the real capital stock does not 
really begin to climb somewhat until the 17th and 18th centuries with accelerating growth in the 19th 
century.  Lambert’s estimated real annual net investment expenditures or change in the capital stock from 
one decade to the next show a similar pattern as displayed in Figure 5.  It appears that investment and 
capital stock amounts do not really begin to be substantive until the 1600s or 1700s, which according to 
many authors is about the time that capitalism becomes the dominant form of economic organization in 
England or the UK.7  It is around 1770 to 1780 and beyond when investment begins to climb dramatically 
(Figure 5), a time period which corresponds to the rise of important textile innovations and their 
implementation in Britain (Caitling 1986). 
In some of the decades real net investment is estimated to be negative perhaps because the 
depreciation of capital stock is greater than total investment or perhaps due to natural disasters, crop 
 
6 An exception is a paper by Broadberry and Pleijt (2021) which estimates capital stock and investment levels of 
different types (working capital, fixed, domestic and overseas assets, etc.) usually going back to the 1350s on a 
every half century basis.   They do not estimate government deficit/surpluses, however.  
7 The United Kingdom formally came into existence in 1707 thanks to the Treaty of Union between England and 
Scotland although the two states had been unified through a common monarch when James I (James VI of 
Scotland) became King of England around 100 years earlier (Macinnes 2011).  Although Great Britain or Britain is 
not quite the same as the United Kingdom, this paper uses these terms interchangeably for ease of exposition.   
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failures, economic recession/depression, or war.8  If some scholars are correct, then the amounts for net 
investment in productive pursuits should be small from the 13th to the 16th centuries but should grow from 
the 17th to the 19th centuries.  In the earlier period, during feudalism, and in the subsequent transition 
period from feudalism to capitalism, economic incentives were either mostly nonexistent or weak whereas 
in the later period they were much stronger.  Much of the large economic surplus of the 13th and 14th 
Centuries could have been saved or spent on military escapades, lavish churches, and/or palaces by the 
aristocracy.9  As Figure 1 illustrates, the economic surplus as a share of net national income does not 
come close to the levels of the 13th and 14th Centuries until the 17th and 18th Centuries.     
Figure 6 displays estimates by Lambert (2021) of English and UK government surpluses and 
deficits over the 1200 to 1860 period in which government spending is normally in surplus until the late 
18th Century and beyond.  Much of this could be for military expenditures (Britain was in many wars and 
armed conflicts in the 18th and 19th Centuries), and data from Mitchell (1988, pages 578-580) shows a 
disproportionate amount of British net public expenditures from 1688 to 1801 to be for the army, navy, or 
ordnance with a low of 20% to a maximum of 96% and an average of 45%.  Barro (1987) writes that most 
of Britain’s deficits during the period of 1701 to 1918 comes from spending on wars with the exception of 
a budget deficit incurred to buy the freedom of slaves from slave owners in 1835-1836 and in a dispute 
over income taxes during 1909-1910.  Barro’s Figure 8 in his paper which plots public debt as a 
percentage of GDP looks very similar to Figure 6 in this paper because he mostly relies on the Mitchell 
 
8 Broadberry and Pleijt (2021) show zero for some of their every 50 year estimates but no negative values.   
9 This paper takes a Post-Keynesian/Kaleckian point of view that almost all wages or labor income is spent on 
consumption and that investment almost entirely comes from upper class income which mostly goes to savings or 
economic surplus (Lavoie 2009).   The high labor costs of the 15th and 16th Centuries are factors that constrained 
the economic surplus amounts as a portion of NNI shown in Figure 1. 
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data.10  Finally Figure 7, using Mitchell’s data, shows UK net public debt as a percentage of GDP from 
1692 to 1860 accelerating during the 18th and 19th Centuries.11   
Using investment levels or changes in capital stock that Lambert derives from estimates from the 
Clark (2009) data, one can calculate a Baran Ratio (Xu 2019, Lambert 2020) which shows the amount of 
investment on a yearly basis that comes out of a society’s economic surplus, which in this case is the sum 
of Clark’s domestic capital and land income estimates plus domestic taxes collected by the state.  If 
overseas borrowing is undertaken to finance investment, or perhaps there exists a capital account surplus 
from overseas exploration/conquest or war, or there are earnings from trading in slaves12, or if 
government debt is used to finance investment, then the Baran Ratio can be greater than one.  Xu (2019) 
labels this the Baran Ratio since the economist Paul Baran (1953 and 1957) believes that capital 
formation mostly comes out of the economic surplus.   
Put on a yearly basis, the ratio can be expressed as 
Baran Ratio = Investment / Economic Surplus . 
 Xu (2019) believes that Baran’s concept of the economic surplus is important in understanding 
investment in a capitalist economy because investment spending can only come from the surplus 
generated from labor.  That is, profits, gains, and rents earned by owners or landlords and the taxes 
collected by a government come mostly if not entirely from the labor employed in capitalist enterprises or 
 
10 Interestingly one thing that Barro finds is that as long as currency could be converted to gold, money supply 
growth and inflation are not problems resulting from the budget deficits or the temporary rises in government 
spending mostly due to military spending.  He claims that such deficits are associated with increases in long term 
interest rates, however, except for the deficits associated with the slave buy out and the income tax dispute. In 
those two cases, long term rates do not rise.   Clark (2001) in estimating deficits from the 1720s to the 1830s finds 
no “crowding out” effects of British deficits.  Figure A1 in the appendix also plots Clark’s estimates of real interest 
rates from 1200 to 1860.        
11 Esteban (2001) writes that the French wars would have been very difficult for Britain to finance had it not been 
for trade credits from India.   
12 Richardson (1987) and Etlis and Richardson (2008), among other scholars, estimate that the British slave trade of 
the 17th to 19th Centuries had a big impact on British economic growth.   Graeber (2006), among others, claims that 
earnings from the slave trade is a key factor in propelling capitalism to greater heights in Europe, yet also notes 
that wage labor is a necessary replacement to slavery since mass consumption is necessary to complement the 
mass production that starts with the industrial revolution.    
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farms.  It is not until the Baran Ratio reaches consistently positive levels and achieves a critical and 
sustained level of more than 1 and usually of around 2 or more that economic growth and higher levels of 
development can be attained.  Figure 8 displays the decadal pattern of the Baran Ratio, which as can be 
seen in the diagram does not begin to increase until late in the 16th Century, and it is not until after 1770 
that the Baran Ratio shows consistent and substantive increases in magnitude, a period long after the 
proliferation of greater property rights brought about by various key events including the English Civil 
War / Revolution and the Glorious Revolution.  Figure 5 shows a similar pattern when it comes to real 
investment amounts.13   
 To domestically invest more than 100% of the economic surplus implies either larger and larger 
amounts of government borrowing and/or capital account surpluses due to foreign investment, trading in 
slaves and/or conquest.  However, Brezis (1995, page 51) shows net capital outflows, not inflows, from 
the late 18th Century to 1900, and Mitchell (1988, pages 449-450) mostly shows positive and growing 
external trade (exports minus imports) balances during this same time period.  This in turn implies capital 
account deficits (investment flowing outward).  Yet, obviously there can be money flowing in although to 
a lesser degree than that going out.  Given Mitchell’s data, greater absolute and per capita debt is 
accumulated during this time period, which although it mostly helped to finance the military, some of it 
could have been used for domestic public investment.  This could also make up for investment outflows.  
Any one or all of these could have made up the extra domestic investment amounts.14   
(Insert Figures 4 to 8 and Tables 1 and 2 around here) 
 Table 1 shows a Pearson correlation coefficient matrix among the variables real economic surplus 
per head, real investment per head, real government surpluses/deficits per head, the Baran Ratio, Clark’s 
 
13 A table of all the data used in this paper is displayed in the appendix.   
14 Clark (2009) calculates domestic estimates for the UK from 1200 to 1860 yet refers to “net national income” 
rather than using net domestic income.  Also, since Broadberry et al (2015) are very careful to count only income 
and output from within England and the UK, one must assume that income and output from colonies and 
territories are not included in their estimates.   
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estimates of real income-based GDP per head, Broadberry et al’s estimates of real output-based GDP per 
head and net public debt as a percentage of GDP (Mitchell 1988 and Chantrill n,d,) for the decades 1200 
to 1860 with the exception of Broadberry et al’s numbers which range from 1270 to 1860.  Per capita 
estimates are made using either Clark’s (2009) or Broadberry et al’s population estimates.  All 
coefficients are statistically significant at an alpha of 5% and show moderate to strong correlations.  More 
importantly, the amount of real economic surplus per capita, real investment per capita, and the Baran 
Ratio are positively and moderately correlated with Clark’s income based real GDP per capita 
measurement and are strongly and positively associated with the Broadberry, et al output based real GDP 
per capita estimates.15   Real government surpluses per capita are negatively and moderately correlated 
with Clark GDP per capita estimates and strongly and negatively correlated with real investment per 
capita, the Baran Ratio and the Broadberry, et al real GDP per capita values.  The greater the real 
government surplus (net total local and national tax revenues less spending), the lower real investment, 
the Baran Ratio and the lower the real GDP per capita on average.  Conversely, the greater the deficit, the 
higher values of these variables on average.16  Finally, net public debt as a percentage of GDP is strongly 
correlated with the economic surplus and moderately and positively correlated with the two 
measurements of GDP per capita, real investment, and the Baran ratio.  It is inversely and moderately 
correlated with government surpluses/deficits in that larger deficits (negative numbers) correspond to 
larger debt percentage numbers which are all greater than zero.    
Since serial correlation exists in the relationships among the variables, using the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (Cheung and Lai 1995) test finds rejection of the null hypothesis that the Baran Ratio, 
Investment per Head, Surplus per Head, and Surpluses/Deficits per Capita are non-stationary (have a unit 
 
15 There is of course a simultaneous relationship among many of these variables with investment not only leading 
to higher real output/income per capita, but the latter also leads to higher investment, consumption, etc., in turn.  
That is, a feedback loop exists among investment and output.   
16 The high negative correlation between investment per capita and government surpluses/deficits per capita is not 
surprising, of course, since surpluses/deficits were derived by taking the economic surplus minus investment 
estimates.   
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root) at 0, 1, or 2 lags whereas there is failure to reject the null hypothesis for Clark Real Income per 
Head, Broadberry GDP per Capita, and Debt as a percentage of GDP at 0, 1, or 2 lags.17 Johansen (1995) 
tests for cointegration for the variables in Table 1 are displayed in Table 2 and show that with a lag of 1 
there are at least 3 or fewer cointegrating equations among the variables.18     
 Figure 9 plots the Baran Ratio as an independent variable against Clark’s real income based GDP 
per capita estimates from 1200 to 1860, and Figure 10 plots the Baran Ratio against Broadberry et al’s 
real GDP per capita values as a dependent variable from 1200 to 1860.  Vector autoregression diagnostic 
techniques indicate that a lag of one provides cointegration for the Baran Ratio and the Broadberry real 
GDP per capita measurement and suggest a lag of 1 or 3 for the Baran Ratio and the Clark real income 
per capita.  However, with the latter pair, a lag of 1 allows the Baran Ratio coefficient to achieve 
statistical significance at 5% whereas this is not the case with a lag of 3.19  Table 3 displays vector 
autoregression models using the Baran Ratio as an exogenous variable with a lag of one and the two 
income/GDP per capita measurements as endogenous variables.  A 1 unit increase in the Baran Ratio is 
correlated with an approximate 2 to 4 unit increase in real income or real GDP per capita on average, and 
each model explains at least 86% of the variation in their respective dependent variables.     
(Insert Table 3 and Figures 9 and 10 around here) 
 A Chow (1960) test indicates that the year 1780 is a valid break point in the data, and in looking 
at Figures 9 and 10, the Baran Ratio beginning in 1780 predicts higher levels of real GDP per head once it 
achieves a consistent level of approximately 1 or more, and then standards of living go up even further as 
the Baran Ratio achieves and then exceeds 2. 
 
 
17 These results can be provided upon request by the author.   
18 Conceptually the relationships among some of the variables should not be spurious since they are related by 
definition. Investment is defined as coming from savings (surplus), and investment is part of the equation GDP = 
Consumption + Investment + Government Expenditures + (Exports – Imports).   
19 Please see these tables in the Appendix.   
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A Post-Keynesian Application of the Baran Ratio 
Keynes discussed an investment multiplier and how it affected consumption and employment 
(248-249) and noted the consequences of savings being greater than investment in the macroeconomy 
resulting in less than full employment and stagnation.  Or, in the minds of Sweezy (1942) and Baran and 
Sweezy (1966), and similar to Keynes (1964 (1936)), not enough of the economic surplus generated by an 
economy was absorbed by investment opportunities, and so the economy often tended toward recession or 
stagnation as 
δ  I / δ t > δ C / δ t 
where the rate of consumption I over time (t) began to fall behind the rate of investment (I) over time 
(Sweezy 1942, 186-189).   
 Many heterodox economists contend that Keynes argued that the disequilibrium between savings 
and investment as well as the gap between actual and full employment and between actual and potential 
real GDP could not only last in the short run but also into the long run and could be the usual state of 
affairs in a capitalist economy (Lavoie 2009, Marglin 2018) .  If so, although we have no real records of 
unemployment or underemployment and potential real GDP in England and the UK during the time 
period covered in the research for this paper, and although feudalism and mercantilism are different 
economic systems than capitalism, this paper tries to show that the greater the level of investment 
expenditures and the greater the Baran Ratio, the greater the real GDP per capita and the greater the 
economic growth.  The slow growth or no-net-growth or static Malthusian economic systems of 
feudalism and mercantilism perhaps could be argued to be a long run equilibrium that is finally 
transformed by the right type and right levels of investment under appropriate institutional settings.   
 Using an “old post-Keynesian” or Cambridge growth equation (Lavoie 2009, 108-109) 
r = g / s 
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where “r” is the profit rate or rate of return to capital, “g” is the economic growth rate, and “s” is the 
propensity to save out of profits, and it is assumed that workers either do not save or save very little out of 
total savings, then rearranging we have 
g = s*r 
     If it is assumed that savings = investment, or that they are roughly equal, then “s” can be considered to 
be similar to the Baran Ratio in this paper, and “r” is the return to capital estimated by Clark (2009).  
Calculating the growth rates over the centuries on a decadal basis and using the last formula, Figure 11 
shows that growth rates do not really become that large and consistently positive in value until the late 16th 
and most of the 17th Centuries, the centuries during which capitalism supposedly becomes more prevalent.  
Prior to this time, growth rates appear to vary widely under feudalism and then tend to vary less so during 
the mercantilism era.  Up until 1600, this paper estimates that the average growth rate is around 0%, and 
then thereafter, it is around 5.6% over the decades, which somewhat supports the econometric work of 
Crafts and Mills (2017).  More so, the growth rate over the decades from 1780 to 1860 is around 10.8%. 
(Insert Figure 11 around here) 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The finding of this exploratory paper are based upon estimates made from historical records 
analyzed by economic historians using various and different techniques.  The data are examined through 
heterodox economic theories and points of view.  A limitation of the results found in this paper is that 
during the periods examined not nearly as many complete economic records existed then as they do 
today.  Clark and his data perhaps are influenced by a Malthusian point of view of medieval times (Clark 
2007a) whereas Broadberry, et al (2015) see this time period as less stagnant.  However, general trend 
estimates from these two comprehensive sources of British economic history over seven centuries have to 
suffice in order to do any type of economic and quantitative analyses of the time period that covers the 
13 
 
transition from feudalism to capitalism.  Most historical accounts with data only go back to the 17th 
Century.   
Yet if the conjectures are fairly reasonable, and since this paper is mostly interested in estimating 
general trends for the purposes or reinforcing and making certain points, the results lend some additional 
support to some of the arguments regarding the transition from feudalism to mercantilism to capitalism.  
Economic surplus, investment, investment rates, government spending and debt appear to be largely 
ineffective or too small before the 17th or 18th centuries to impact standards of living.  This supports 
Crafts and Mills (2017) who argue that trend growth in England and the UK up until the industrial 
revolution basically roughly averages zero and supports Clark (2007b) on how the general economic 
efficiency and productivity of the British economy is mostly stationary until the 17th Century.20  As Clark 
(2001) notes, government deficits have no “crowding out” effects on the economy of the 1700s and 
1800s, and one could speculate that the deficits actually have a “crowding in” effect on British economic 
growth given the analysis above.     
It can also be argued that the type and level of investment also matters.  In Baran’s view, a lot of 
the economic surplus would have been wasted in the 13th and 14th centuries when feudalism is still the 
dominant economic system.  The economic surplus as a portion of net national income according to the 
2009 Clark data is higher in these centuries than later ones, yet investment levels are lower.  Even with 
feudalism in decline in subsequent centuries, some of the economic surplus could have been “wasted” by 
the aristocracy on cathedrals, palaces, and wars rather than spent on productive machinery and tools or on 
ports, canals and roadways.  Sweezy (1976(1950)) notes that traders and merchants during the 
mercantilist era improved transportation technology but did not contribute much to changes in productive 
technology.  Brenner (1985) writes that medieval and mercantile era guilds, through their monopoly 
power, frustrated investment in innovative techniques, and it is not until petty producers come along that 
 
20 Graphs of real GDP per capita using the Clark and Broadberry et al data showed pretty much a flat line trend 
pretty much during both feudalistic and mercantilistic (or transition period) epochs.   
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this changes.  Investment in larger land holdings and more advanced farming techniques yield greater 
economies of scale than the typical smaller, medieval farms that featured mostly subsistence style farming 
(Brenner 1985, Heller 2011, Cockshot 2019).  These events coincide with the enclosure movement as 
those who are forced to leave common farm areas become the manufacturing workers of the industrial 
revolution (McCloskey 1972, Marx and Engels 2004 (1848)).  Rights to property, investment, and global 
trade are established well before the late 18th Century, but perhaps dramatic gains are not seen in real 
GDP per capita until 1780 and beyond as this paper shows.  Perhaps property rights are a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for strong economic development and robust growth.  Other major conditions 
are the levels of public and private sector investments that need to reach a certain level before real and 
sustained economic growth occurs. 
For those readers familiar with the Dobby-Sweezy debate (Dobb 1947, Sweezy 1976 (1950) 
among many other publications) as well as the Brenner debate (Brenner 1976, Brenner 1985, Heller 1985, 
Heller 2011 among many others), the statistical findings of this paper are probably not surprising since 
many of these authors note the stagnation of most of the medieval period and economic decline in the late 
medieval period in Europe.  They also note the slow and gradual transition from feudalism to 
mercantilism and then to capitalism and the takeoff of economic growth with the agricultural and 
industrial revolutions.  This paper’s findings also somewhat support the writings of those who emphasize 
the importance of property rights for investment and economic advancement in that such rights are not 
strong enough for advancement until around the 16th and 17th centuries (North and Thomas 1971 and 
1973, McCloskey 1972).   
As classical economists like Smith and Marx and later the neo-Marxists Baran (1953 and 1957) 
and Baran and Sweezy (1966) noted, some forms of business could be claimed to be “productive” and 
others as “unproductive” or wasteful.  Baran and Baran and Sweezy claimed that much of finance, 
retailing, wholesaling, advertising, military expenditures, R&D efforts on packaging and design, etc. in a 
capitalist economy were all wasteful and really did not contribute that much to a society’s economic net 
15 
 
welfare.  On the other hand, “productive” industries included those in manufacturing, mining, agriculture, 
education, etc. in which the populace gains something tangible and useful from the consumption of their 
products or services.  Therefore, not only did innovation and investment matter, but also the type of 
investment in innovation (productive versus unproductive) could matter in addition to the property rights 
and strong national government presence needed to secure the rights of ownership and to profits. 
Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (2003 (1943)) noted how that the 
economies that preceded capitalism were like a circular flow system of trading of exchange that remained 
static and never really expanded.  It was only with innovation and investment under capitalism that the 
circular flow expanded and grew thanks to waves and cycles of innovation.  For Schumpeter, early in 
capitalism entrepreneurs sought investment for their ideas in order to make a profit.  In the General 
Theory (1964(1936)), Keynes indicated that job creation during an economic downturn could be done 
through unproductive activities such as burying treasury notes in bottles and having workers dig them 
back up again (129) although he conceded that it would be better to have people employed in more 
productive activities through greater levels of some type of investment even if it meant the “socialization” 
of some investment.  British governmental deficits and net public debt grew substantially probably due to 
military and warfare expenditures, which are unproductive uses of resources in some minds (Baran and 
Sweezy 1966, Mohun 1994, Lambert and Kwon 2015), yet some funds were spent on ports, bridges, 
canals, roads, and other forms of infrastructure.21   
Perhaps many topics and themes discussed in this paper do not cover that much new ground. Yet 
it is argued that the Baran Ratio concept succinctly summarizes how a large enough level of investment is 
necessary for a society to make large advancements in standards of living.  To re-invest all of the 
economic surplus or its equivalent and to dramatically increase government spending and to earn huge 
 
21 Although Baran and Sweezy emphasized that it was World War II that eventually lifted the US out of the Great 
Depression and restored full capacity utilization and full employment.   
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amounts on exports on a continuous basis are large amounts of stimuli for a national economy.22  A 
modern day example could be China perhaps.  At the same time, many of the other advanced nations of 
the world are being criticized for not reinvesting enough in their infrastructure, schools, and health care 
systems.   If there also exists too much unemployment and underemployment in various world economies, 
then greater use of corporate profits for reinvestment in productive activities such as manufacturing and 
construction or greater spending by governments on infrastructure and education at even higher levels 
than exist now in order to start on a path of greater economic growth may be a viable alternative as 













22 It is granted that Britain engaged in a slave trade and engaged in overseas conquest in order to expand its export 
business, and these also are factors in its debt and deficit levels.  Yet it also engaged in investment in many 
productive activities such as infrastructure, scientific innovation, manufacturing plants, etc.   
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Source: Gregory Clark, “National Income, Prices, Wages, Land Rents, Population, England, 1209-1869”, from his website, 









































































































































































Source: Gregory Clark, “National Income, Prices, Wages, Land Rents, Population, England, 1209-1869”, from his website, 
http://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/data.html .   
 
 
Source: Gregory Clark, “National Income, Prices, Wages, Land Rents, Population, England, 1209-1869”, from his website, 
















































































































































































































































































































































Source: Lambert (2021) estimates based on Gregory Clark, “National Income, Prices, Wages, Land Rents, Population, England, 
1209-1869”, from his website, http://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/data.html .   
 
 
Source: Lambert (2021) stimates based on Gregory Clark, “National Income, Prices, Wages, Land Rents, Population, England, 








































































































































































































































































































Source: Lambert (2021) estimates based on Gregory Clark, “National Income, Prices, Wages, Land Rents, Population, England, 
1209-1869”, from his website, http://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/data.html .   
 
 













































































































































































































































































































Source: Estimates based on Gregory Clark, “National Income, Prices, Wages, Land Rents, Population, England, 1209-1869”, 









































































































































































Figure 8:  Baran Ratio
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Real Economic Surplus per Head 1       
Real Investment per Head 0.4357* 1      
Real Govt Surpluses/Deficits per Head -0.2991* -0.9892* 1     
Baran Ratio 0.3851* 0.9739* -0.9698* 1    
Clark Real Income per Head 0.7312* 0.4032* -0.3084* 0.3495* 1   
Broadberry, et al Real GDP per Head 0.7329* 0.8195* -0.7875* 0.7304* 0.5295* 1  
Debt/GDP Pct 0.6900* 0.5386* -0.5116* 0.5034* 0.5489* 0.4993* 1 
 
*p < 0.05 
 
                       Table 2–Johansen tests for Cointegration 
 
 
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =      16  
Sample:  52 – 67                                        Lags =     1   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------  





0 7 -255.93659 . 262.4201 124.24 
1 20 -201.46118 0.9989 153.4692 94.15 
2 31 -169.40441 0.98181 89.3557 68.52 
3 40 -146.36658 0.94385 43.2800* 47.21 
4 47 -135.5438 0.7415 21.6345 29.68 
5 52 -128.47646 0.58663 7.4998 15.41 
6 55 -126.07518 0.2593 2.6972 3.76 
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Table 3—Vector Autoregression Results 
 
1) Dependent Variable is Clark Real Income Based GDP per Capita 
b  S.E. 
Constant      8.59  5.2 
Baran Ratio, 1 lag     3.93*  0.82 
 
n=66 
Adj. r2 = 0.87 
 
2) Dependent Variable is Broadberry Real GDP per Capita 
 
b  S.E. 
Constant      -3.17  2.17 
Baran Ratio, 1 lag     2.06*  0.74 
 
n=59 

























































































































































































Source: Clark (2009). 
 
Data 
(money values in £s) 
Decade Econ Surplus per Capita Baran Ratio Clark Income Based GDP per Head Broadberry GDP Per Head 
1200 13.83 0.00 133.33  
1210 13.99 -0.52 124.67  
1220 11.09 -0.17 109.48  
1230 9.16 -0.28 99.35  
1240 9.31 -0.22 109.31  
1250 9.92 0.19 104.90  
1260 10.11 1.03 100.82  
1270 7.64 -1.23 74.02 48.54 
1280 6.76 0.51 82.35 43.43 
1290 7.14 -0.50 71.73 45.49 
1300 5.50 0.43 73.04 48.32 
1310 4.75 -0.36 64.71 49.43 
1320 8.26 -0.23 80.88 48.56 
1330 7.29 0.59 89.54 47.89 
1340 6.75 0.21 83.99 49.69 
1350 8.44 -1.20 100.49 62.72 
1360 8.80 -0.32 109.31 61.67 
1370 4.96 1.40 107.52 59.02 

















































































































































Fig. A1: Real Return on Capital, 1200 to 1860
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1390 7.75 -0.62 120.75 71.39 
1400 9.07 0.14 130.07 69.73 
1410 7.74 -0.43 128.27 69.34 
1420 9.02 0.37 136.77 70.08 
1430 8.35 -0.39 131.70 66.65 
1440 8.64 0.21 149.18 67.57 
1450 10.16 0.03 149.02 67.46 
1460 9.65 -0.26 142.16 66.99 
1470 7.76 -0.37 133.17 64.49 
1480 8.59 -0.31 127.78 66.10 
1490 7.76 0.17 134.64 68.09 
1500 8.52 0.48 126.80 71.28 
1510 8.55 0.63 121.90 73.05 
1520 7.34 -0.50 111.60 73.46 
1530 8.07 0.22 111.28 70.39 
1540 8.48 -0.33 109.80 70.07 
1550 5.33 -1.81 88.89 65.81 
1560 5.91 1.14 98.04 76.40 
1570 7.22 2.27 99.18 73.09 
1580 8.55 -1.89 100.98 63.51 
1590 6.91 -0.04 93.63 63.71 
1600 8.38 1.36 96.90 71.83 
1610 8.56 0.94 91.34 68.99 
1620 8.55 0.34 92.81 70.55 
1630 6.98 -0.11 84.64 62.82 
1640 7.86 0.46 87.09 64.98 
1650 6.18 0.77 91.99 70.39 
1660 7.05 0.75 96.24 76.95 
1670 7.09 -0.41 93.79 79.82 
1680 7.65 0.95 100.82 87.67 
1690 7.96 -1.03 90.69 98.98 
1700 7.06 1.96 100.00 100.00 
1710 6.51 -0.54 97.55 93.85 
1720 8.09 1.61 100.16 102.65 
1730 8.65 1.74 113.24 104.96 
1740 7.44 -0.16 108.17 105.74 
1750 9.03 1.00 111.11 109.39 
1760 9.12 1.46 110.78 117.35 
1770 9.38 -0.08 108.50 117.79 
1780 8.98 1.33 107.35 119.67 
1790 9.03 1.96 111.77 125.20 
1800 8.78 1.99 114.22 133.04 
1810 11.19 1.59 120.75 132.07 
32 
 
1820 10.42 3.01 128.92 136.40 
1830 11.19 2.04 135.62 150.25 
1840 10.12 3.40 141.18 167.14 
1850 11.70 4.25 153.11 191.67 





Decade Investment per Capita Govt Deficit/Surplus per Capita Mitchell Debt Pct GDP 
1200 0.00 13.84  
1210 -6.77 19.70  
1220 -1.84 12.52  
1230 -2.72 12.37  
1240 -2.25 12.47  
1250 1.87 8.03  
1260 9.96 -0.32  
1270 -8.25 14.98  
1280 3.61 3.49  
1290 -3.08 9.27  
1300 2.49 3.29  
1310 -1.78 6.70  
1320 -1.76 9.52  
1330 4.70 3.33  
1340 1.49 5.62  
1350 -8.80 16.16  
1360 -2.79 11.52  
1370 9.62 -2.78  
1380 6.70 2.35  
1390 -5.02 13.13  
1400 1.29 7.76  
1410 -3.79 12.61  
1420 3.37 5.79  
1430 -3.39 12.19  
1440 2.16 7.92  
1450 0.33 9.69  
1460 -2.49 12.19  
1470 -3.02 11.18  
1480 -2.57 10.86  
1490 1.45 6.96  
1500 3.82 4.22  
33 
 
1510 4.58 2.74  
1520 -3.54 10.68  
1530 1.76 6.09  
1540 -2.39 9.66  
1550 -9.26 14.38  
1560 6.55 -0.78  
1570 14.38 -8.03  
1580 -14.42 22.03  
1590 -0.26 6.50  
1600 11.24 -2.95  
1610 7.40 0.46  
1620 2.67 5.18  
1630 -0.78 7.79  
1640 3.18 3.74  
1650 5.46 1.59  
1660 5.58 1.86  
1670 -2.98 10.19  
1680 7.44 0.43  
1690 -7.10 13.98  
1700 15.08 -7.37 23.43 
1710 -4.12 11.75 34.08 
1720 12.74 -4.79 82.95 
1730 15.48 -6.57 76.15 
1740 -1.29 9.45 67.71 
1750 9.01 -0.02 107.44 
1760 13.00 -4.12 130.22 
1770 -0.74 9.50 111.34 
1780 11.16 -2.74 94.89 
1790 17.81 -8.73 92.18 
1800 20.37 -10.14 111.03 
1810 16.88 -6.26 115.70 
1820 32.72 -21.84 169.03 
1830 22.42 -11.41 154.99 
1840 37.17 -26.24 130.80 
1850 49.85 -38.11 129.66 








Vector Autoregression Diagnostics 
 
Selection-order criteria     
Sample:  5 - 67                              Number of obs      =        63   
lag     LL LR df    p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0  -277.777   421.553 8.8818 8.90856 8.94984 
1  -217.483 120.59* 1  0.000 64.1768 6.99945 7.03959* 7.1015* 
2  -216.337 2.2916 1  0.130 63.8868 6.99482 7.04834 7.13089 
3   -214.93 2.814 1  0.093 63.077* 6.9819* 7.0488 7.15199 
4  -214.348 1.1629 1  0.281 63.9364 6.99519 7.07546 7.19929 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+   
Endogenous:  Clark Income based GDP per head   
Exogenous:  Baran Ratio     
       
Selection-order criteria     
Sample:  12 - 67                             Number of obs      =        56   
lag     LL LR df    p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0  -256.426   596.851 9.22951 9.25756 9.30185 
1  -168.926 175* 1  0.000 27.1788* 6.14021* 6.18228* 6.24871* 
2   -168.39 1.072 1  0.300 27.6368 6.15678 6.21287 6.30145 
3  -167.907 0.96617 1  0.326 28.1583 6.17524 6.24535 6.35608 
4  -167.594 0.62495 1  0.429 28.8683 6.1998 6.28393 6.4168 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+   
Endogenous:  Broadberry GDP Per Head    
Exogenous:  Baran Ratio     
 
